The Taliban’s manifesto of oppression
On July 31, 2024, the Taliban Ministry of Justice published Official Gazette No. 1452, comprising 110 pages. Official Gazettes are treasure troves of contemporary legislative history in Afghanistan, and, by browsing through their pages, one can see the ups and downs the country has experienced over the past 60 years. The collection of Official Gazettes that was digitized during the Republic era and made available to the public on the Ministry of Justice’s website contains crucial documents from 1963 to the present. The Taliban have preserved that digital resource, and, recently, have added several collections of decrees by Mullah Hibatullah as well as Taliban “legal” documents.
The last issue of the Official Gazette of the Islamic Republic (No. 1410) was published on August 11, 2021, four days before the Taliban takeover of Kabul. At 504 pages, that issue was relatively thick and included the following documents:
1. Agreement on the Loan for the Kabul Ring Road Project (Phase 1) between the Saudi Development Fund and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
2. Loan Agreement between the Republic of Italy and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
3. Cooperation Agreement on the Integrated Regional Early Warning System for Disasters in Asia and Africa
4. The SAARC Development Fund Regulation
5. The Road Traffic Convention (Vienna, November 8, 1968)
6. The Road Signs and Signals Convention (Vienna, November 8, 1968)
I include these details to better illustrate the depth of Afghanistan’s regression after the Taliban takeover and to show that, despite the numerous challenges during those war-torn, unstable times, the country was moving in a non-Taliban direction. The issues under discussion and debate were relevant to the needs of time.
The Taliban do not pay heed to the needs of time and place, and they are trying to impose the imagined society they learned in madrasas on Afghanistan. Since August 15, 2021, the Taliban have published 40 issues of the Official Gazette in the Ministry of Justice’s database, with two other Gazettes yet to be listed, including the one under discussion (No. 1452). On November 5, 2022, the first collection of Mullah Hibatullah’s decrees was published. It was 56 pages long, mostly focused on administrative affairs, land and property, and the Taliban’s internal regulations in light of the new circumstances. Then, in June 2023, the first detailed collection of Mullah Hibatullah’s decrees and orders was published. In the 65 decrees recorded in that Gazette, Mullah Hibatullah again primarily focused on consolidating power.
Women are an important subject of the Taliban leader’s decrees. As expected, women have a negative place in Taliban law, and they are referred to as weak, overly susceptible to corruption, and worse, as sources of corruption. In one decree, Mullah Hibatullah advises Taliban fighters not to grow their hair so long that it falls below their shoulders because, according to him, “this resembles women and is considered cursed.”
The first decree exclusively focused against women
The Hibatullah decree on women was issued on November 21, 2021, three months after the capture of Kabul.
In that decree, women are referred to as independent human beings, different from the property, such as houses, livestock, and lands, but they are not deemed worthy of equality with men, therefore, they are not directly addressed by the Taliban leader’s decree. His decree is directed at men, briefly outlining the approach to marriage in six points: obtain the woman’s consent in marriage, do not force a widow into marriage, give a dowry to a widow in a second or subsequent marriage, give inheritance rights to women from family assets, and maintain justice among multiple wives. These are the sum total of rights that the Taliban gives to women.
In that decree, which appears to be the most important legal document of the Taliban regarding women, there is no mention of women’s property rights, freedom, right to education, or social, economic, and political participation. After that decree, the endless series of restrictions on women accelerated, and over time, schools, universities, work, travel, bathhouses, and entertainment were closed to them.
The Taliban are tightening the noose on the people every day, and building and imposing a system on society that resembles an extremist madrassa.
The Taliban do not believe in law
The Taliban do not believe in law in the modern sense and declare that their law is sharia. In the Taliban emirate, sharia is the decrees of Mullah Hibatullah, which are issued without investigation, consultation, or a needs assessment, and everyone is obligated to obey them without question. In the previous non-Taliban system, legislation was seen as tools for creating opportunities, connections, dialogue, cooperation, service provision, and facilities. In the current Taliban era, the law is a tool for closing, limiting, cutting off connections and contacts, and preventing any gatherings and cooperation among the country’s inhabitants.
What is recognized as law in today’s world is fundamentally different from what the Taliban consider “law.” The Taliban consider law as a religious command, fixed and timeless, while the non-Taliban view of law is of a social phenomenon strongly dependent on time and constantly changing and evolving. The Taliban search for law in religious books and the imaginations of clerics, while the non-Taliban draft laws based on the experiences of the past and the knowledge of the present, addressing specific needs of society.
Under the Taliban regime, the law resembles a uniform tailored by an arrogant tailor who claims to know the exact measurements of the wearer by divine knowledge. This tailor disregards the current measurements of the person who must wear the uniform and dictates that people must fit themselves into the garments he has made. In a non-Taliban system, efforts are made to tailor the law to fit the society, with a focus on understanding the contemporary needs of the people. In the Taliban reality, the law is seen as part of a pious effort to purify the soul and strengthen faith, and they promote the idea that physical and spiritual suffering in this world is part of the process of purification. In a secular system, laws are designed for the material and spiritual well-being of this world and must be based on experience and understanding.
If we don’t pay attention to these differences, we will fail to understand the behavior of the Taliban and have unrealistic expectations from them. For example, some of our compatriots complain about why the Taliban don’t create a constitution. They ask why the Taliban don’t quickly draft laws on higher education, labour, media, and other issues. These compatriots don’t realize that if the Taliban were to write a constitution, it would be nothing more than a summary of Mullah Hibatullah’s decrees, with no consideration for non-Taliban views or the needs of society. Any laws that the Taliban might draft on media or education would merely be a collection of prohibitions and restrictions. The foundation of the Taliban emirate rests on pillars of elimination, prohibition, restriction, and discrimination.
The Taliban’s interpretation of ‘virtue’
Even though the Taliban occupy government offices, regulate budgets, collect taxes, and provide some basic services through these offices, the hardline leaders of the group expect the primary duty of every state official to be the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice. They have an army, police, and intelligence service, and they engage in various activities to maintain their positions, but they evade accountability by declaring that their duty is to establish an Islamic society through the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice. When the people demand jobs, freedom, education, and well-being, the Taliban respond that the emirate is tasked with the “moral and religious reform” of society, and the people should seek their other needs from God. In the early months of the Taliban’s second emirate, we heard from Mullah Hassan Akhund, the group’s prime minister, that the Taliban are not responsible for the people’s bread, and Afghans should seek their sustenance from God. Therefore, the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice is declared the central principle of Taliban governance. In a recent document, the Taliban defined virtue as any word or deed that sharia considers good.
Good deeds can encompass a wide range of constructive and beneficial activities. Respect for individual and social freedoms, education, work, justice, and efforts to improve well-being are all good deeds, but they do not fit into the Taliban’s lexicon as good deeds. The Taliban’s concept of virtue is focused on acts of worship and the regulation of sexual relations between men and women. The most important virtue in the group’s new decree is prayer. Religious enforcers are tasked with monitoring people’s observance of the five daily prayers. While the majority of the people are more committed to prayer than the Taliban and do not need state supervision or guidance to perform it, the Taliban seem to view non-prayer as more widespread than hunger, illiteracy, or unemployment. In two appendices to the “law” on the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice, Mullah Hibatullah has extensively discussed the importance, etiquette, and manner of performing prayers.
Another major virtue for the Taliban is the hijab, which this time is addressed in more detail than in previous decrees by Mullah Hibatullah and is far more extreme than what they have implemented to date. The Taliban have also set limits on the dress and grooming of men – men are instructed not to shave their beards and to cover themselves from the navel to the knees – but the main focus of hijab is the body of women. The limits on women’s hijab extend to their entire body, including their voices.
Here are some of the Taliban’s hijab rules:
In section 10 of the Terminology chapter, hijab is defined as follows: “Sharia hijab refers to clothing that covers the entire body and face of a woman from non-mahram (unrelated) men. It should not be thin, short, or tight.”
In many Muslim societies, hijab does not include covering the hands, feet up to the ankles, and the face. Some Muslim societies do not even consider covering the head as necessary, allowing women to appear in public without wearing a headscarf. However, in the Taliban’s concept of hijab, the entire body of a woman is considered aurat. Until now, the Taliban have allowed women to show their eyes. But the new definition of hijab suggests that in the future, women will be forced to cover their entire face including eyes, with the full-body hijab resembling the infamous cage-like burqa.
In Article 13 of the first chapter, the details and manner of observing hijab are discussed. The new point in this section is the introduction of women’s voices as part of aurat. This is the first time in three years that the Taliban have ordered that women’s voices be concealed. Section 3 of that article states that women’s voices are private and, therefore, they are not allowed to sing or recite poems or the Quran aloud in public gatherings.
In Section 10 of Article 22, women’s voices are listed among specific prohibitions, and enforcers are instructed to prevent “the sound of a woman’s voice or music coming out of home.” According to this order, if a woman sings or recites the Quran loudly at home, so that her voice is heard on the street or in a neighbour’s house, she is committing a prohibited act, and the Taliban vice and virtue police can reprimand or punish her.
The Taliban’s interpretation of ‘vice’
The Taliban define vice as “a word or deed that Sharia considers bad.”
a) Regulating sexual conduct is a major part of the Taliban’s vice and virtue law, and it is discussed in detail in numerous articles. Under the title of hijab, eight measures are listed on how to eliminate women from society. For example, it is said that Muslim women should cover themselves from when near non-Muslim women; men and women should not look at each other’s bodies and faces; and whenever an adult woman leaves her home for a need, she is obliged to conceal her voice, face, and body. Rules have also been issued regarding sexual relations between men and women, women with women, and men with men. Even the most private relationship between a man and a woman (spouses) has been given a list of must-nots.
b) Many restrictions are imposed on the media. The three main media-related “vices” are: publishing material contrary to Sharia and religion, publishing material containing insults to Muslims, and publishing material containing images of living beings. The Taliban themselves are also perpetrators of this last “vice.” Many images and videos of “living beings” are published on the website of the Taliban’s Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. Videos and pictures of the minister himself, who is in charge of implementing this inhumane law, are repeatedly published in the media. The state’s own television channel and other media are used to broadcast the Taliban’s visual and video propaganda. Non-governmental media are also busy publishing interviews and pictures of powerful Taliban figures. This reveals the gap between the Taliban’s ideals and the realities on the ground. After the publication of this law, the Taliban launched a campaign to enforce new restrictions on women and other deprived and defenseless people, but powerful Taliban figures continue to publish images of their feasts, wedding convoys, picnics, meetings, and travels.
c) Entertainment and recreation are also considered vices. Music and singing are well-known vices for the Taliban. In recent years, they have repeatedly harassed and punished singers and artists. The burning of musical instruments and the destruction of art have become common and continuous practices for the Taliban. In the new law, this vice has been further emphasized, with the Taliban declaring music, songs, and the playing musical instruments to be prohibited and forbidden.
The many powers of the Taliban vice and virtue police
In Persian literature, the “mohtasib,” or religious police, is notoriously infamous, often described with attributes such as spy, liar, enemy of love, foe of joy, hypocrite, and the lackey of oppressive rulers. The mission of vice and virtue police is to scrutinize beliefs, issue deceitful commands and prohibitions, and suppress joy and pleasure. This term is aptly suited to the role of the officials of the Taliban’s “Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice.” The Taliban have presented the mohtasib as someone appointed by the Amir al-Mu’minin (the Taliban leader) or another competent emirate authority to carry out the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice.
Certain conditions have been established for a person to become a mohtasib, including possessing the power to command and prohibit. This power, aside from personal characteristics, is derived from the authority granted by the Taliban emirate. In the third chapter of the law, under the heading of punishments, the powers of the vice and virtue are elaborated, which include carrying out imprisonment and corporal punishment. On page 75, Clause 7 states that the vice and virtue can impose penalties as he sees fit on someone he deems guilty of vice, even if the reasoning is not under the jurisdiction of the courts. Essentially, the vice and virtue agents can punish individuals they considers to be committing vice without a trial and based solely on their judgment. Other clauses outline the hierarchy of authority and the sequence of punishments, but Clause 7 explicitly gives the vice and virtue police a free hand to act.
One of the duties of the vice and virtue police is stated as preventing the violation of people’s rights and defending the oppressed. However, this law is filled with methods of stripping away people’s rights and freedoms, and the vice and virtue police have no authority to oversee the actions of the rulers and those who possess the means and tools of oppression, such as Mullah Hibatullah, the commanders, and his ministers. The law does not mention that, if an emirate official violates someone’s rights or commits an injustice, the enforcers must punish these oppressors in the same way they would punish women who do not conceal their voices or men who look at the faces of unrelated women.
The task of addressing official and emirate injustices seems to be delegated to another section titled “Listening to Complaints,” and the law written for it is much less stringent than others. In “Listening to Complaints,” the emirate officials are not obligated to pursue the oppressor; rather, the oppressed are required to approach them and register their complaint “in accordance with the rulings of sharia.” The sharia rulings range from the length of a man’s beard to the tone of a woman’s voice, covering every detail of appearance whether private and social relationships. Thus, if a Taliban complaint officer wishes, the majority of complainants will not even be eligible to file a complaint due to their “violations of sharia rulings.” The Taliban official could tell a woman complainant to cover her entire face with a veil, conceal her voice, and then come back with her male guardian to register the complaint. Or he could tell a male complainant to grow his beard to a fist-length before he can file his complaint!
It is certain that the Taliban have not changed. They have spent the last three years fighting against the changes that had occurred in the 20 years of non-Taliban rule. The question is how long the people will tolerate this regression, and how far we are from the day when public patience runs out.
Younus Negah is a researcher and writer from Afghanistan who is currently in exile in Turkey.
