On Friday, April 10, 2026, armed men opened fire on Shia civilians in the village of Dahmiri, in Injil district of Herat province, killing and injuring dozens, according to local sources and media reports. Among the casualties were women, children, and the elderly.
Reports indicate that the victims had gathered for a religious and recreational event when they were indiscriminately attacked by unknown gunmen. Although a website attributed to ISIS–Khorasan (ISKP) has claimed responsibility for the massacre, Shia communities as well as international human rights organizations point out that atrocities have occurred repeatedly since the Taliban regained power.
Richard Bennett, the United Nations special rapporteur on human rights in Afghanistan, states that the attack “appears to fit a pattern and must be not only condemned but independently investigated and perpetrators brought to justice,” in a post on X. Waiz Zada Behsudi, an influential Shia cleric based in Kabul, stated in a cautious statement, “Protecting the lives of fellow citizens is their [the Taliban’s] primary, necessary, and binding religious and legal duty. I strongly urge them to swiftly arrest the perpetrators of this tragedy and bring them to justice.”
The Council of Shia Scholars in Herat also issued a statement demanding investigation and punishment of those responsible. Mourners attending the victims’ funerals likewise called on the Taliban to fulfill their responsibility by identifying and prosecuting those behind the massacre.
The Taliban’s overt anti-Shia ideology
The Taliban are an extremist religious movement rooted in Deobandi madrasas, and they maintain a clear anti-Shia stance, refusing to recognize Shiism as a legitimate religious tradition in Afghanistan. During the current period of Taliban rule, a number of Ismaili Shia followers in provinces such as Badakhshan have reportedly been coerced into changing their religious affiliation. Clerics aligned with the Taliban have framed these forced conversions as a “return to Islam.”
Neda Mohammad Nadeem, the Taliban’s minister of higher education and a close associate of Hibatullah Akhundzada, has publicly declared that only followers of the Hanafi Sunni school exist in Afghanistan. In line with this position, the Ministry of Higher Education has introduced a 14-point pledge requiring students to formally declare adherence to the Hanafi Sunni sect; otherwise, they are denied access to universities.
Since the Taliban’s return to power, Shia communities have had no representation in the Taliban cabinet. The teaching of Ja‘fari jurisprudence has been suspended in universities in Shia-majority areas such as Bamiyan. The Taliban have also restricted Shia religious practices, including Ashura commemorations, and have confiscated books and materials related to Shia theology, labelling them deviant. These materials are banned from sale, distribution, or library circulation.
In some cases, the Taliban have gone further, banning textbooks in other disciplines simply because they were authored by Shia scholars. Most recently, the Ministry of Higher Education has suspended the operations of Ibn Sina University, a prominent and respected Shia-affiliated private university in Kabul.
The continued killing of Shias
Pressure on Shia communities has not been limited to cultural, regulatory, and structural measures but has also taken the form of physical elimination and mass killings. Such violence continues unabated since the Taliban returned to power, in stark contrast to their repeated claims that they have ensured security throughout the country and that ISIS has no presence in Afghanistan.
Findings by the Afghanistan Analysts Network indicate that in the first year of Taliban rule alone, at least 222 Hazara and Shia individuals were killed in terrorist attacks. In October 2021, Shia worshippers in Kunduz and Kandahar were targeted in attacks that left more than 100 people dead. In September 2022, the Kaaj educational centre in a predominantly Shia area of Kabul was attacked, killing more than 50 Hazara and Shia students.
Throughout 2023, Shia and Hazara communities were targeted in multiple locations, including Dasht-e Barchi in Kabul, Jebrail in Herat, and Pul-e Khumri in Baghlan, resulting in dozens more deaths. In September 2024, another attack in the village of Qariyodal in Daikundi province left 14 Hazara Shia residents dead.
These incidents represent only a portion of the targeted attacks against Shia and Hazara communities over nearly five years of Taliban rule. In none of these cases have the Taliban taken meaningful steps to identify, arrest, or prosecute those responsible.
The Taliban’s suspected role in the Herat massacre
Local witnesses report that, prior to the attack, the Taliban warned residents that the presence of women and children at outdoor recreational or pilgrimage gatherings was forbidden. Since returning to power, the Taliban have not only deprived women of the right to work and education, but have also banned them from parks and public leisure spaces. Despite these restrictions, residents of Dahmiri village gathered with their families at a shrine in the early days of spring to enjoy the natural environment.
Given the Taliban’s anti-Shia stance, their rule appears to be implicated in the continuation of mass killings of Shia and Hazara communities on two levels. On the first level, there is the possibility of direct organization and execution — an accusation the Taliban have failed to credibly refute. On the second level, even under the most charitable interpretation, the Taliban’s governance reflects negligence in ensuring the security of Shia communities, and the regime’s spread of anti-Shia racism effectively signals to extremist actors that such crimes will not be meaningfully investigated or punished.
Sharif Ghazniwal is the pseudonym of a former university professor from Kabul.
