The lack of a political alternative sustains the Taliban’s fragile tyranny
Since returning to power, the Taliban have not only failed to gain domestic and international legitimacy but have also intensified public hatred and frustration toward their rule. Nevertheless, the political and military opposition to the Taliban has been unable to present a reliable – or viable – alternative that is acceptable to both the Afghan public and the international community. By the Taliban’s opponents, I refer to all political and social movements, including political parties and alliances that are committed to principles such as the rule of law, governance based on popular will, inclusive participation, and equal citizenship rights. The Taliban have stripped women of their basic rights, removing them from all social spheres, marginalized ethnic and religious minorities, and increasingly suppressed media freedom and freedom of expression. The country has plunged into a severe economic and humanitarian crisis which has triggered migration issues affecting regional countries. Education for half of the population is banned, while the other half is exposed to extremist indoctrination rather than genuine learning.
Security was once promoted by the Taliban and their supporters as their main achievement. It has proven to be illusory. Threats from ISIS as well as the Taliban’s oppressive policies toward their opponents and minority groups have made life insecure for large segments of the population.
Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan is stuck in an increasingly dark limbo.
In this essay, I seek to explore the critical weaknesses hindering the opposition to the Taliban and analyze why they have failed to become a viable alternative to the regime.
Unified political umbrella
The primary challenge facing Taliban opponents is fragmentation and disunity. Despite efforts to establish unified political platforms such as the National Assembly for the Salvation of Afghanistan and the Supreme Council of National Resistance for the Salvation of Afghanistan, opponents still remain divided. The absence of a unified resistance strategy significantly undermines the effectiveness of their struggle.
While the National Resistance Front and the Freedom Front, led respectively by Tajik leaders Ahmad Massoud and Yasin Zia, engage simultaneously in guerrilla warfare and political opposition, other groups led by Pashtun figures like the National Liberty Party of Afghanistan (Rahmatullah Nabil) and the National Movement for Peace and Justice (Hanif Atmar) emphasize only political resistance. Major segments of the Supreme Council of National Resistance, which includes leaders such as Abdul Rashid Dostum, Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf, Mohammad Mohaqiq, Yunus Qanooni, and Salahuddin Rabbani, have also focused exclusively on political approaches.
Engagement with the Taliban
In the absence of a unified political front, disagreements over how to engage with the Taliban represent another significant issue for the opposition. Political movements associated with Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek ethnic groups are generally skeptical of negotiations with the Taliban, advocating instead for a democratic political system inclusive of all ethnicities and political factions.
In contrast, Pashtun opposition circles remain hopeful of negotiations with the Taliban within the framework of the Doha agreement. Although the Taliban have so far rejected all negotiations, former foreign minister Hanif Atmar insists on dialogue under United Nations supervision and views armed conflict with the Taliban as a mistake. Additionally, Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf’s recent proposal to form a so-called “Council of Settlement and Resolution” has been interpreted as an ideological alignment with the Taliban.
On the other hand, women’s social and political movements, emerging as central and distinct pillars of resistance against Taliban rule, follow their independent paths, emphasizing individual and social freedoms for women.
Social base
Most political opposition movements are led by former jihadist leaders, their children, or officials from previous governments. Their unsuccessful records during the mujahedeen and republican eras have significantly diminished their social base and public support. Many view these leaders as responsible for the bloody civil wars of the 1990s and the corruption that led to the Republic’s collapse. Parties such as Jamiat-e-Islami, Hezb-e-Islami, Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami, and Junbish-e Milli-e-Islami have histories marred by violence and internal fragmentation, which has resultedin lost credibility and grassroots connections. These factions have increasingly become mafia-like family enterprises, primarily serving the interests of select families and narrow circles of loyalists.
Political territory
The absence of political territory and the lack of physical presence of opposition groups within Afghanistan significantly diminish their ability to effectively challenge the Taliban and maintain connections with the populace. Historical precedents — the mujahedeen’s victory over Najibullah’s government in 1992, the Northern Alliance’s role in the fall of the Taliban in 2001, and the Taliban’s resurgence in 2021 — demonstrate that successful shifts in Afghanistan typically involved control over some internal territory. Until Taliban opponents secure geographical territory within Afghanistan, they will neither be taken seriously by the international community nor become a source of hope for a population exhausted by Taliban oppression. In other word, there is a reciprocal link between external support for opposition groups against Kabul’s ruling authority and their capacity to mobilize people and control territory.
External support
Political developments in Afghanistan have consistently been influenced by foreign intervention. The Taliban came to power through foreign agreements, and despite a legitimacy crisis, support from regional countries and cooperation from the United States have kept them in power. Opposition groups based in countries such as Turkey, Iran, the Persian Gulf states, and even Europe and the U.S. lack sufficient support. European countries and the U.S. have repeatedly stated that they do not support armed resistance against the Taliban.
Additionally, despite disputes over Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) activities and border tensions, Pakistan remains perceived as the Taliban’s key sponsor. Contacts between Pakistan or other regional states with opposition groups are largely tactical and aimed at exerting leverage over the Taliban rather than genuinely strengthening the opposition. Meanwhile, Tajikistan, despite its explicit support for Afghanistan’s Tajiks and refusal to hand over Afghanistan’s embassy to the Taliban, cannot serve as a significant external supporter for anti-Taliban opposition due to economic constraints and its strategic alignment with Russia.
The Taliban’s failure to achieve domestic and international legitimacy underscores the ongoing necessity for a viable political alternative. However, Taliban opponents lack a unified political umbrella, essential social base, and territorial control. Simultaneously, the Taliban continue to enjoy greater foreign backing compared to their opponents.
In Afghanistan, foreign support remains a decisive factor for establishing government authority. Consequently, political opponents of the Taliban face significant challenges in becoming a credible alternative. Notably, external intervention triggered by rising dissatisfaction with the Taliban cannot be entirely ruled out. Such an intervention, similar to the events after September 11, 2001,, would likely place decision-making authority once again in foreign hands.
*Omid Sharafat is the pseudonym of a former university professor in Kabul and an international relations researcher.
