No council of elites will bring legitimacy or stability
Elections and the right to vote have been a central question in Afghanistan’s contemporary political debate. Attitudes toward elections and the acceptance or rejection of the parliament have distinguished democrats from non-democrats, Islamists from non-Islamists, revolutionaries from non-revolutionaries, while simultaneously causing internal fractures within each of these groups.
Since the 1960s, when King Zahir Shah and his close circle agreed to share political power beyond the royal family and the palace, to today’s Taliban who consider their amir in Kandahar worthy of unconditional obedience, one of the central disputes has been the people’s right to vote.
Monarchists in the 1960s were split between supporters of constitutional monarchy and defenders of absolute monarchy. Naturally, their disagreement centered the people’s right to vote. Advocates of constitutional monarchy argued that elections and the participation of the people, elites, and influential figures beyond the royal family would lead to progress, neutralize revolutionary inclinations and violent attempts at overthrowing the government, and thus sustain the monarchy.
Opponents contended that the people lacked the necessary political maturity to use their right to vote responsibly for the collective benefit of Afghanistan. They believed involving the masses in vital state matters would result in anarchy and weaken the foundations of the monarchy. Within the royal family, Daoud Khan opposed elections and power-sharing. He halted the constitutionalist movement through a coup and established an absolute, single-party republic.
Leftist forces, which at that time had considerable influence among urban dwellers and educated villagers, also split into two main factions over the question of elections and parliamentary engagement: those who supported participating in elections as a way to build their ideal society, and those who rejected any participation in election.
The Islamists are similarly divided into pro- and anti-election factions. One group supports an elected Islamic government with a president and parliament, while the other group believes in an Islamic government ruled by an absolute amir.
he Taliban represent the extreme version of this latter group and align themselves with revolutionary leftists and absolute monarchists regarding elections and voting rights. This alignment led to shared fronts and cooperation during the period of jihad. Some leftists, who had taken arms against the “revisionists” and “parliamentarists” within the Khalq and Parcham factions, aligned themselves with very conservative Islamists. A segment of these revolutionary leftists even advocated for the return of Zahir Shah to power, viewing elected governments as a bourgeois tactic and imperialist tool to delay revolution.
From the Taliban’s perspective, elections and popular participation delay the establishment of a “pure” Islamic system, corrupt society, weaken Muslims’ faith, and prevent a truly devout death.
All those who reject elections, parliament, and democracy share the belief that governance is the domain of elites. For monarchists, these elites are royal aristocrats; for proponents of an emirate, they are religious scholars; and for revolutionary leftists, they are party elites.
All three view ordinary people as incapable of discerning right from wrong, truth from falsehood, or beneficial from harmful. They see solutions in royal decrees, revolutionary commands, or religious edicts. For them, the correct path is predetermined, eliminating the need for negotiation or discussion on how to run the country or society. Thus, the king, emir, or revolutionary leader — each claiming divine right, being God’s chosen, or the great leader — is seen as possessing ready-made solutions and extraordinary wisdom, whose every command is deemed correct and decisive.
These three groups of politicians first exclude the general public, along with political and ideological opponents, from the realm of rights. Then, for power-sharing and selecting their king, emir, or leader, they propose the creation of unelected councils. Absolute monarchists advocate a loya jirga or council of elites; proponents of an absolute Islamic government propose a council of religious scholars, known as Shura-Ahl-e-Hal Wa Aqd; and revolutionaries refer to a revolutionary council as their source of legitimacy. However, none of these councils hold genuine authority as their members speak and decide based on pre-determined agendas dictated by one or a few absolute rulers.
Recently, the suggestion to form such a shura resurfaced in the media. Former jihadi leader Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf, who has previously spoken passionately in defence of the right to vote in elections, has now declared that if the Taliban establish such a council, he will accept its decisions and the Taliban government will gain legitimacy. This view means that legitimacy is ceremonial and not rooted in participation by all, just one privileged group.
The fundamental difference between authoritarian and democratic participation lies in the diversity of participants. Democratic elections are grounded on the principle that society consists of diverse groups, classes, and segments. Elections provide an opportunity for farmers, workers, shepherds, factory owners, teachers, merchants, women, men, the elderly, youth, the affluent, and the hungry to express their distinct needs and priorities. Local elites and religious scholars cannot adequately represent all social classes and sectors, nor reflect their interests in council decisions. The priorities of a mullah differ from those of a farmer; similarly, the wishes of an influential elite do not align with those of workers.
Some argue that elections are marred by fraud, that candidates are usually elite individuals, and that it is rare for someone from marginalized groups to have a real chance at serving in district councils, provincial councils, or parliament. Often, people’s votes are manipulated, and the disadvantaged cannot find suitable candidates able to navigate through the nomination filters. These critiques are justified. Establishing genuinely representative councils that reflect all social classes, groups, and professions is neither easy nor always achievable in every election. Yet, democracy is a process whose successes should be measured relatively. Elections represent a correct but lengthy path that cannot be completed in a single step; each step is valuable.
On the other hand, councils such as the loya jirga or the Shura-Ahl-e-Hal Wa Aqd prolong Afghanistan’s conflict and postpone the building of a national consensus essential for stability. If top-down social engineering worked, and if the people truly desired it, Afghanistan would never have reached the era of Mullah Hibatullah. Instead, the kings and leaders who came before him would have used their own councils to bring stability and prosperity to the country.
