Pakistan and its strategy of supporting Kabul’s opponents
In recent days, Taliban’s internal bickering amid political turmoil in Afghanistan accelerated after the United States suspended its foreign aid program. Soon, reports surfaced of a meeting between Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Afghan opposition politicians in Turkey.
For the past half-century, Pakistan has used Kabul’s opposition groups to challenge and even facilitate the collapse of the Afghan state. As the main supporter of the Taliban during their 20-year war against the U.S.-led military coalition and the U.S.-backed Afghan Republic, Pakistan had expected friendly relations with the Taliban after they returned to power. In early September 2021, then-ISI chief General Faiz Hameed traveled to Kabul. In the Serena Hotel’s lobby, he responded to journalists’ questions about Afghanistan’s future with one sentence: “Everything will be fine.” The tea he was sipping at the time was later dubbed “victory tea.”
That expectation did not hold as relations between the Taliban and Pakistan grew increasingly tense. Based on Pakistan’s mastery of leveraging Kabul’s opposition groups against the regime in power, analysts anticipate that it is again seeking to engage with Taliban opponents for its own gain.
Friendship from Pakistan’s viewpoint
Since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has had a tense and challenging relationship with Afghanistan even while emphasizing its commitment to friendship. But what does Pakistan mean by “friendship”?
This was the explanation of Rangin Dadfar Spanta, Afghanistan’s foreign minister from 2005 to 2010, in a 2017 conversation with the author: “Pakistan will not be satisfied with anything less than turning Afghanistan into a subordinate state under its control. I fully understand this. Pakistan, whether through the Taliban or through those in suits and ties, seeks to turn Afghanistan into its protectorate — just as Lebanon was under Syria’s influence until 1980.”
If we examine Pakistan’s concept of friendship, the core elements of it include:
- Regulating Afghanistan’s foreign relations — particularly with India — in alignment with Pakistan’s interests.
- Acceptance of the Durand Line as the official Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
- Accepting Afghanistan as Pakistan’s “strategic depth.”
- Abstaining from supporting Pashtun and Baloch insurgents in Pakistan.
- Maintaining Afghanistan’s dependence on Pakistani ports and avoiding efforts to establish alternative trade routes.
- Allowing Pakistan access to Afghanistan’s water resources without obstruction.
- Ensuring that Pakistan plays a dominant role in training Afghanistan’s civilian and military personnel.
However, successive past governments in Kabul — from the monarchy to Daoud Khan’s republic, the People’s Democratic Republic, and the Islamic Republic — have not conformed to this version of friendship. Even after the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, tensions never subsided between Kabul and Islamabad. Instead, the Taliban expanded ties with India, refer to the Durand Line as a “hypothetical border,” and, according to Islamabad, engaged in frequent border clashes while providing comprehensive support to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
In the past three years, terrorist activity has surged in Pakistan. According to the Global Terrorism Index, Pakistan ranked as the fourth most affected country in the world in 2024, with three of the 20 deadliest terrorist attacks in the world occurring in Pakistan.
Historical background
The formation of Afghanistan was the result of an agreement between major world powers in the second half of the 19th century. The interests of rival empires — Britain and Russia — took precedence over the needs of Afghanistan’s inhabitants. Defining Afghanistan as a “buffer zone” made its leaders dependent on foreign support. Throughout the Great Game, the Cold War, and the past three decades, Afghan rulers have exploited geopolitical rivalries to secure foreign aid rather than strengthen domestic resources or systematically invest in the extraction of the country’s mineral wealth.
Kabul’s opposition forces have followed the same pattern over the past half-century by seeking external backing to challenge the central government. One of the fundamental issues in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations is the Durand Line, which divided the Pashtun population between the two countries. Given this historical context, the ISI gained extensive expertise in organizing adversaries to whatever regime is in power in Kabul.
For instance, look at Pakistan’s systematic support for Kabul’s opposition during the presidency of Daoud Khan in Afghanistan (1973–1978) and the tenure of prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in Pakistan (1973–1977). During these years, Daoud Khan backed Pashtun and Baloch separatists in Pakistan, prompting Pakistan to retaliate by supporting anti-Daoud Islamists, including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Yunus Khalis, and Jalaluddin Haqqani. The first anti-Daoud operation, which was led by Haqqani’s forces using Pakistani territory, occurred in July 1975 in present-day Paktia, where a convoy from Urgun district was ambushed. Twelve people died.
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, numerous jihadist groups were established, armed, and funded in Pakistan. The then-military ruler of Pakistan, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, prioritized building madrasas and expanding the concept of jihad. While international aid poured into the region from the United States and Arab nations, the ISI maintained exclusive control over its distribution and utilization.
During the Islamic Republic (2004-2021), the Taliban kept bases in Pakistani cities such as Miranshah, Peshawar, and Quetta. The Taliban insurgency, which intensified after 2005, would not have been possible without Pakistan’s full-scale support.
Prospects of Pakistan’s engagement with Taliban opponents
Based on past experience, Pakistan’s potential support for Taliban opposition groups can be envisioned in three distinct phases, each with its own complexities.
In the first phase, Pakistan would merely use the threat of supporting Taliban opponents as a bargaining chip to extract concessions from the Taliban leadership. This would be a tactical maneuver rather than an actual commitment to backing the opposition.
The second phase could see limited tactical — though not strategic — cooperation between the ISI and anti-Taliban forces. Their shared goal of weakening the Taliban might bring them closer, but significant ideological and historical obstacles remain. Most Taliban opponents come from the former Northern Alliance, which has a long-standing anti-Pakistan stance. Given this legacy, trust between the two sides would be difficult to establish.
The third phase would mark a turning point in Afghanistan’s political landscape, where the Taliban would either be forced into negotiations or face defeat. This phase presents a major challenge for Pakistan, as it must ensure that the cycle of its adversaries’ victories does not repeat itself.
Historically, during the war against Kabul, Pakistan mobilized Afghan, Pakistani, and foreign fighters under the banner of jihad. The current situation is different. The Taliban are in power and claim religious and Islamist legitimacy; their intellectual and cultural roots remain deeply embedded within various regions of Pakistan. Additionally, because the TTP maintains a strong presence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, it’s impossible for Pakistan to rally fighters under the pretext of jihad, as it did in the past. Moreover, the local political situation along the border does not favour direct collaboration between Pakistan and Taliban opponents.
Given these constraints, Pakistan’s support would only serve to provide the Taliban opposition with minimal protection. It is likely that anti-Taliban forces would welcome Pakistan’s backing as a short-term tactical move. It’s also likely that the ISI and Pakistan will not gain full control over those opposition groups.
Given the reports of that meeting in Turkey, it seems that Islamabad is in the first phase of its support and is yet again conducting calculated maneuvers to secure its interests in Afghanistan.
Mohammad Qasim Erfani was a former university professor in Kabul and an international relations researcher and writer.
