The publication of the Taliban’s new penal code marks yet another step in their effort to drag the country back into a medieval order, this time under the guise of a seemingly legal document. This code, which has been issued and endorsed by the Taliban authorities, is made up of 10 chapters and 119 articles and reflects the group’s intent to monopolize power, redefine social hierarchy, erase the civic status of the country’s residents, and legitimize the widescale use of centuries-old violence in the 21st century.
The Taliban openly signal their determination to return the country to an era of ignorance and brutality by abolishing all previous Afghan laws, which drew on the experiences of neighboring and global countries and embraced an interpretation of Islam rooted in tolerance and moderation, striving for legal equality, human dignity, and respect for broader human rights, and by replacing them with this code,.
Of course, the Taliban have already enforced many aspects of this new penal code since regaining power in 2021 in practice. Therefore, its official publication serves as a legal cover and an attempt to legitimize the group’s discriminatory, violent, and class-based conduct.
Given the wide range of reaction to the Taliban’s new penal code, it is necessary to understand its key pillars:
The absolute monarchy of Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada
In modern political systems where popular sovereignty is the foundational principle, the role of a monarch has either been abolished or is strictly defined and limited by law, often reduced to a symbolic function. Only in absolute monarchies does the king stand above the law, serving simultaneously as the source of law and the ultimate authority on its interpretation. Through long, costly struggles for constitutionalism, Afghanistan left behind the era of absolute monarchy more than a century ago.
Yet, at this moment, the Taliban have granted Mullah Hibatullah the effective status of an absolute sovereign, marking nothing less than a return to the age of unchecked kingship. Article 1 of this code designates Mullah Hibatullah as the authority for drafting and interpreting law. Articles 118 and 119 further emphasize his exclusive powers to amend, annul, or ratify this document and any other laws.
The concentration of all powers in the hands of Mullah Hibatullah also reveals deep mistrust within the Taliban’s own ranks as the authority to revise or interpret the law has not been delegated to any institution under his supervision.
A caste-based social hierarchy
This penal code identifies four social groups:
- Mullahs and aristocracy
- The tribal leaders and merchants
- The middle class
- The lower class
According to Article 9 of this code, punishments for these four groups are explicitly discriminatory. If a scholar or elder in the highest caste commits an offense, the judge merely issues a warning, and that is all. Tribal leaders and merchants who commit the same violation are only summoned to court and given a reprimand. But if the very same offense is committed by someone from the lowest class, then they must receive corporal punishment, which can include up to 39 lashes.
Such discriminatory treatment can only be understood as an endorsement of a caste system and a division of citizens into unequal ranks. Under this penal code, scholars are granted a privileged status reminiscent of the clergy during the Middle Ages. Article 17 states explicitly that anyone who says they do not accept the words of the scholars is subject to two years in prison..
Legitimizing vigilante justice and summary punishment
This document outlines the methods of proving offenses punishable by ta’zir, as well as who may carry out such punishments and upon whom they may be imposed—resulting, in practice, in the clear legitimization of vigilante justice and summary punishment.
Article 4, which explains the distinction between hudud and ta’zir, states explicitly that a ta’zir offence can be established even in the presence of doubt, and that children may also be subjected to punishment. By contrast, hudud offenses cannot be established in cases of doubt and cannot be applied to children.
The penal code further states that any Muslim who witnesses a person committing a sin against “the rights of God” — meaning acts considered harmful to public morality rather than to a specific individual — is permitted to carry out the punishment themselves.
Under this provision, any Muslim (“Muslim” is effectively defined as adherents of the Hanafi school) may claim to have witnessed someone committing a sinful act and may, on that basis, administer punishment personally, even if the alleged offender is a child.
Such authorization means that individuals favored or sanctioned by the Taliban authorities are effectively granted free rein to commit violence against others.
Denial of religious pluralism
Another hallmark of this return to a medieval order is the rejection of other Islamic sects and the insistence on the exclusive legitimacy of a single school of jurisprudence. Such a position logically results in pressure on followers of other sects.
Article 26 of this code explicitly states that no one in Afghanistan has the right to leave the Hanafi school, and anyone who does so will be punished. Limiting the punishment for “leaving the faith” solely to those who depart from the Hanafi school implies that other Islamic sects are not afforded the same respect or legal standing. In effect, it suggests that abandoning the Ismaili faith, the Twelver Shia sect, or other denominations and religions is permissible or even desirable.
This stands in stark contrast to the reality of Afghanistan, a country diverse not only ethnically and linguistically but also religiously, where different sects have historically coexisted with mutual respect. If Afghanistan was keeping to global norms, it should be moving toward greater religious tolerance and pluralism, not reversing it.
Given the inclusion of this section of the Taliban’s penal code, it becomes evident that reports of pressure on Ismailis to convert are entirely consistent with the Taliban’s broader religious policy.
Treating women as property
Articles 32 and 34 of the Taliban’s penal code address the relationship between husband and wife. The type and scale of penalties assigned to men and women reveal that, in the 21st century, the Taliban still treat women as commodities under the ownership of males.
This section states that if a man severely beats his wife, including causing fractures, wounds, or bruises, and the woman is able to prove it, the man will be sentenced to 15 days in prison. But if a woman goes to her parents’ home without her husband’s permission and does not return, both she and her father will be sentenced to three months in prison.
The disparity in these punishments makes it clear that women are regarded as property. The clause concerning punishment for a man who harms his wife also stipulates that the woman must prove that the fractures, wounds, or bruises were caused by her husband. In a deeply patriarchal society—especially one under Taliban rule—this is virtually impossible. Women are usually coerced into retracting accusations and clearing their husbands of wrongdoing.
Conclusion
The points highlighted above are only a few examples of the Taliban’s medieval approach toward the universally accepted values of the modern world. Extracting and analyzing all elements of this code that contradict human values and the norms and imperatives of the 21st century would require extensive time and space.
At the same time, the publication of this code is useful as it provides human rights defenders and Afghanistan researchers with an official Taliban document they can cite when engaging governments, organizations, and institutions connected to Afghanistan. While the Taliban have denied enabling widespread violence against the citizens of Afghanistan, this code stands as irrefutable evidence of its religious and gender discrimination.
Omid Sharafat is the pseudonym of a former university professor in Kabul and a researcher of international relations.
