As tensions intensify between the Taliban and Islamabad, we are witnessing an unprecedented welcome extended by New Delhi to the Taliban’s foreign minister, along with India’s announcement that it is upgrading its diplomatic presence in Kabul to the level of an embassy.
In the summer of 2021, after the Taliban seized control of Kabul, the general perception was that Islamabad was the clear victor and New Delhi was the definite loser in the long-running rivalry between India and Pakistan for influence in Afghanistan. From the 1990s until 2021, Pakistan had not only helped found the Taliban but had remained their main supporter, whereas India supported the Northern Alliance during the 1990s and maintained warm relations with the central government in Kabul during the republic era.
However, over the past four years, we have witnessed a gradual transformation in both countries’ relations with the Taliban, while Pakistan has escalated from rhetoric and minor clashes to outright bombing Kabul and Kandahar
The process of improving relations between India and the Taliban
After August 15, 2021, and the Taliban takeover, Pakistan — alongside Russia, Iran, and China — was among the few countries that continued their diplomatic activities in Afghanistan. India, in line with Western countries, closed its embassy in Kabul.
The visit of General Faiz Hameed, then head of Pakistan’s intelligence agency (ISI), to Kabul in early September 2021 — and a widely circulated photo of him grinning and holding a tiny cup of tea in his hand in the city — was interpreted as a symbol of Pakistan’s triumph and dominance over Afghanistan. However, relations between Pakistan and the Taliban did not progress as expected, while India gradually began to engage with the Taliban.
In March 2023, Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi announced the reopening of several regional countries’ embassies in Kabul, including that of India. However, their diplomatic activities were limited to technical and humanitarian affairs and did little to reduce the Taliban’s international isolation.
On April 27, 2025, India’s special representative for Afghanistan, Anand Prakash, visited Kabul. During his meeting with Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Indian diplomat expressed concern about terrorist groups potentially basing themselves on Afghan soil and emphasized the need for an inclusive government in Afghanistan.
On May 16, 2025, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar held his first telephone conversation with Amir Khan Muttaqi, during which he thanked the Taliban for condemning the terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir. The Pahalgam attack, which killed 26 tourists and was claimed by the “Kashmir Resistance” group, triggered a series of missile strikes and retaliatory bombings between India and Pakistan.
The meaning of that phone call was clear: India was satisfied with the Taliban’s position during the crisis between India and Pakistan, and the Taliban were not siding with Islamabad.
Meanwhile, the embassy of the former Afghan government in New Delhi had remained closed since October 2023 due to a lack of support from the Indian government. Subsequently, Taliban diplomats took control of Afghanistan’s consulates in Mumbai and Hyderabad.
After his recent meeting with Amir Khan Muttaqi, Jaishankar announced that India’s diplomatic activities in Afghanistan would be upgraded to the level of an embassy. Hosting Amir Khan Muttaqi and reopening the embassy in Kabul effectively amounts to the de facto recognition of the Taliban government — although India has not yet made any statements regarding formal recognition.
Nevertheless, the Taliban foreign minister’s acknowledgment that Kashmir is part of India has angered Pakistan. The Taliban’s growing ties with India, along with their recent military clashes and the bombing of Kabul and Kandahar, indicate that contrary to expectations, the Taliban are aligning with India, while Pakistan is openly showing its frustration over its failure to manage the Taliban.
Background of India–Taliban relations
In the 1990s, India closed its embassy in Afghanistan after the Taliban took control of Kabul. From New Delhi’s perspective, the Taliban were viewed as a proxy group created and backed by Pakistan’s intelligence services, which posed a direct threat to India’s interests. During that period, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates were the only countries to formally recognize the Taliban government.
To counter Pakistan’s growing influence in the region and to protect its strategic interests, India aligned itself with Iran and Russia by supporting the Northern Alliance. Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the fall of the Taliban regime, India reopened its embassy in Kabul and established close relations with the new government.
Throughout the two decades of conflict between the Taliban and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and its NATO-led Western allies, India viewed the Taliban as a Pakistani ally. New Delhi consistently condemned the Taliban and its associates for a series of terrorist attacks targeting Indian diplomatic missions across Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, during 20 years of U.S. and NATO military presence in Afghanistan, the Taliban leadership continued to receive strong support from Pakistan. The movement operated through structures such as the Quetta Shura and the Miran Shah Shura and enjoyed intelligence, financial, and logistical backing from Islamabad. Pakistan, in turn, faced repeated criticism from its Western allies, including the United States, for supporting the Taliban. At times, that criticism led to the suspension or reduction of foreign aid.
Factors behind India’s shift in approach
Broadly speaking, two main factors explain India’s changing stance toward the Taliban: the shifting regional geopolitics and the Taliban’s growing distance from Pakistan.
The regional geopolitical landscape has transformed since the withdrawal of NATO and the United States from Afghanistan. In this new era, key regional powers such as China, Russia, and Iran — all of which have adversarial relations with Washington — became close partners of the Taliban. Russia has formally recognized the Taliban government, while China, Iran, and several Central Asian and Arab countries have also developed close ties with the group.
Given this reconfigured regional environment — where no strong internal resistance movement against the Taliban remains, and neighbouring states have chosen engagement over confrontation — India has adopted a pragmatic approach toward the Taliban. New Delhi now seeks to engage with the Taliban in a bid to counter Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan and protect its own strategic interests.
This shift also coincides with India’s gradual distancing from the United States and an improvement in its relations with China, whereas Pakistan’s ties with Washington have once again strengthened. Indeed, in the China–U.S. dichotomy, Islamabad is now perceived as leaning closer to Washington than to Beijing.
Another crucial factor is escalating tension between Pakistan and the Taliban. Since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, violence and attacks by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have sharply increased within Pakistan. Pakistan’s repeated demands that the Afghan Taliban restrain the TTP have produced no tangible results.
This ongoing tension culminated in Pakistan’s airstrike on Kabul on October 9, reportedly aimed at killing the TTP’s leader, Mawlawii Noor Wali Mehsud. The attack failed, and Mehsud survived, triggering widespread border clashes between Taliban forces and Pakistani troops.
Pakistan, for its part, accuses the TTP and other militant groups operating against it of being supported by India, allegedly using Afghan soil to carry out attacks inside Pakistan.
The challenge of conflicting values
India’s expanding engagement with the Taliban government has resulted in criticism both within Afghanistan and inside India. Many observers see an inherent contradiction between a democratic nation growing closer to such an extremist movement.
From the perspective of Afghan political and intellectual circles, the Taliban are viewed as a terrorist and extremist group that neither represents the Afghan people nor constitutes a legitimate government. For many in Afghanistan, India, long regarded as Afghanistan’s trusted friend, should not legitimize the Taliban, as doing so could endanger future relations between the two nations.
On the other hand, many critics within India argue that rolling out the red carpet for a terrorist leader who shows no respect for women’s rights, rejects elections, and denies public participation stands in stark contrast to India’s pluralistic and democratic values.
A clear example of this value clash occurred when no women were present at Amir Khan Muttaqi’s press conference in New Delhi, prompting widespread outrage from Indian politicians and civil society activists. The backlash forced the Taliban foreign minister to hold a second press briefing with women in attendance—a symbolic concession that underscored the profound ideological gap between the two sides.
In terms of ideology and values, the Taliban share far more in common with the government of Pakistan than they do with that of India. Therefore, despite the current unprecedented military confrontation, it is expected that Pakistan will continue its efforts to influence and reshape the Taliban’s leadership, particularly by moderating or replacing more defiant elements within the movement.
Omid Sharafat is the pseudonym of a former university professor in Kabul and a researcher of international relations.
