Four years have passed since the Taliban returned to power, and the group continues to face a crisis of both domestic and international legitimacy. The Taliban seized political control of the country on August 15, 2021, through an internationally brokered arrangement known as the Doha Agreement. However, since this transfer of power did not reflect the will of the people, the Taliban’s rule lacks internal legitimacy.
Nevertheless, they maintain a monopoly on power, while opponents inside the country have been violently suppressed and are unable to protest. Yet the Taliban’s international isolation and lack of legitimacy cannot be denied, as there are clear and measurable indicators such as formal recognition and official diplomatic engagement.
In this article, I examine the extent of the Taliban’s international isolation, the leverage the group is attempting to use to engage with the region and the world, and the obstacles it faces in gaining international legitimacy.
The extent of the Taliban’s international isolation
In February of this year, Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid claimed that the Taliban administration has diplomatic relations with 40 countries: “Our embassies, consulates, and representatives are in contact with 40 countries, and these countries also have embassies in Afghanistan.” However, the official website of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs—now under Taliban control—lists only 29 countries with which the group maintains diplomatic relations.
Despite these claims, only one country—Russia—has formally recognized the Taliban government, doing so in early July 2025. No other state has granted official recognition. Nonetheless, the international community appears divided over how to engage with the Taliban, much like it is on many other global issues. While Western countries have largely resisted normalizing relations with the group, regional countries have been more actively engaged.
Countries such as Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, India, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan have repeatedly hosted senior Taliban officials, handed over control of Afghan embassies and consulates to the Taliban, and accepted ambassadors or diplomatic envoys from the group. Several of these countries have resumed operations of their diplomatic missions in Afghanistan or elevated their representation to the ambassadorial level. Foreign ministers and senior officials from Pakistan, China, Qatar, Uzbekistan, Iran, and India have also visited Taliban-ruled Kabul.
An expected visit by Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian to Kabul would mark the second high-level state visit since Uzbek Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov’s trip in August 2024.
Meanwhile, the Taliban remain largely isolated from the West. Despite Germany’s agreement to accept two Taliban diplomats to handle consular affairs, and Norway’s hosting of a Taliban delegation for mediation talks, the isolation is palpable. The Afghan embassies in the United Kingdom and the United States have been closed, while Afghan missions in New York and Geneva remain under the control of diplomats from the previous government. The United Nations has not recognized the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate rulers.
Furthermore, Afghan embassies in Canada, Belgium, France, Italy, Austria, Poland, Switzerland, and Australia are still operated by former diplomats and remain outside Taliban control. In East Asia, South Korea, and in the region, Tajikistan also continues to keep Afghan embassies out of Taliban hands, with diplomats from the previous regime still in charge. On the other hand, Afghan embassies in the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and some other countries are reportedly being managed in coordination with the Taliban.
The Taliban’s bargaining chips in regional and global engagement
The Taliban’s most significant bargaining chips in dealing with the region and the wider world include: fighting ISIS (Islamic State Khorasan Province), cutting ties with al-Qaeda and other international terrorist groups, maintaining internal cohesion, the absence of a viable political alternative, the end of formal war, and their focus on mining and participation in regional trade and economic initiatives. By leveraging these factors, the Taliban have persuaded regional countries to build closer ties and convinced Western nations to refrain from supporting armed opposition groups.
The fight against ISIS-K is the Taliban’s most valuable asset in dealings with both regional and Western governments. For the West, the group’s purported disengagement from al-Qaeda is also important, and the Taliban appear to have succeeded in reassuring Western powers on this front. For Russia, stability in Afghanistan and cooperation in countering ISIS outweigh concerns about human rights or ethnic inclusion in governance.
For China, controlling the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), accessing Afghanistan’s natural resources, and implementing the Belt and Road Initiative through Central Asia via Afghanistan are key priorities. For Iran, strategic interests lie in mining, water access, trade, and ensuring that the Taliban do not support the Jaish al-Adl insurgent group.
The Taliban’s success in preserving internal cohesion—despite power distribution challenges between the Haqqani network and the Kandahari Taliban on one hand, and between Pashtun and non-Pashtun factions on the other—along with their suppression of armed opposition and the absence of formal warfare, has led countries like India, Iran, and Russia (who were once staunch opponents of the Taliban in the 1990s) to now become close partners of the group.
Although this period has seen tensions and border clashes between the Taliban and Pakistan over the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), the Taliban have ultimately yielded to Islamabad’s pressure and adopted a policy of restraining the TTP. Meanwhile, concerns in China, Russia, and Iran that a Taliban collapse could benefit Western influence have further pushed these countries toward closer relations with the group.
Obstacles to gaining international legitimacy
The Taliban’s path to international legitimacy faces major obstacles, including severe human rights violations—particularly the exclusion of women from work and education—monopolization of power, the absence of an inclusive government, corporal punishments for violations of the group’s social code, the persecution and torture of former government personnel, and the strict enforcement of Taliban interpretations of Sharia law.
According to the Doha Agreement, which laid the groundwork for the Taliban’s return to power, it was expected that an inclusive government would be formed through intra-Afghan negotiations. However, the Taliban have refused to honour that part of the agreement, rejecting any talks with other political factions.
During negotiations with the U.S. between 2018 and 2020, the Taliban attempted to portray themselves as ‘changed’ that recognized women’s rights. But once in power, they rapidly reinstated and intensified restrictions on women. Women have not only been barred from work and education but have been completely excluded from all aspects of public life.
According to the UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) report for the first quarter of 2025, since the Taliban’s return in August 2021, women have been systematically denied social participation. The same report documented that in January and February alone, at least 50 Ismaili citizens in Badakhshan were forcibly coerced—through violence and threats—into converting to Sunni Islam.
UNAMA also reported that during the first quarter of the year, women and girls accused of moral crimes were publicly flogged. As a result of these abuses, on July 8, 2025, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, the Taliban’s supreme leader, and Abdul Hakim Haqqani, the head of the Taliban’s Supreme Court.
In addition to this, 135 Taliban leaders and senior officials remain on international sanctions lists. Given these circumstances, Russia’s move to formally recognize the Taliban administration was met with widespread international condemnation. Other countries currently engaged with the Taliban have also stated that they are in no rush to recognize the group’s government.
Conclusion
Although the Taliban have significantly expanded their engagement and influence across the region and beyond, their administration continues to face a lack of international legitimacy. The barriers to legitimacy still outweigh the strategic advantages the group claims to offer. Even countries that may benefit from relations with the Taliban face serious moral and ethical constraints in formalizing those ties. Therefore, the Taliban remain internationally isolated—and their core philosophy prevents them solving this problem.
*Omid Sharafat is the pseudonym of a former university professor in Kabul and an international relations researcher.
