The Taliban: An anti-national force
Debate about the Taliban and nationalism flares up whenever tensions increase between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some talking heads brag about the Taliban’s exemplary role in protecting the country’s territorial integrity while Taliban officials invoke deceptive slogans of the Afghan nation, its land, and history. At such moments, nationalist fervour ignites among Taliban’s low ranks as well as many ordinary Afghans.
Despite dissatisfaction with the Taliban’s domestic policies, some still expect them to act in the national interest. But what is nationalism, and what is the Taliban’s relationship to it?
Nationalism is both a product of and a tool of societies transitioning from feudal to capitalist mode of life. . Over the past two centuries, many societies have developed industries, markets, and capital, and in the struggle over dividing territories, both financial and political, today’s nation states have taken shape. The inhabitants of each country are called a “nation,” and political efforts to advance the country, protect the collective interests of its residents, and foster a sense of solidarity and unity among its people are referred to as nationalism.
When aimed at a country’s progress, securing the rights of its people, and fighting against oppression, and colonization, nationalism is a progressive movement. However, it turns into a regressive movement when it becomes a tool for aggression, discrimination, and supremacy.
Where internal capacity for transitioning beyond rural and nomadic lifestyles has not fully developed, locales have been pushed toward nationhood under external pressure. Afghanistan is one such example — a land that formally became a country, in which various nations live within its borders but have neither acclimated to their geographical boundaries nor developed the necessary capabilities for becoming a unified nation.
The borders of present-day Afghanistan were drawn by Britain and Russia in the late 19th century, and two fundamental flaws in this boundary-drawing process continue to plague Afghanistan’s inhabitants. The first flaw is that the residents of this land had not reached a level of economic and political development to understand the necessity of a nation state. As a result, many felt alienated from the imposition of state authority and revolted against it.
The second flaw is how Afghanistan’s borders were drawn to cut off corners of three distinct regions — Central Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and the Middle East — and enclose them within a single territorial cage. Additionally, the Hindu Kush and Baba Mountain ranges internally divided the territory. Kabul is distanced from Peshawar and Delhi; Herat is severed from Mashhad and Merv; and Balkh is disconnected from Samarkand and Bukhara. Those divisions meant that major parts of Afghanistan failed to develop effective connections and exchanges among themselves. Consequently, they were condemned to decay and regression.
Many countries were initially formed under such external pressures, however those same pressures s later pushed them a few steps closer to becoming workable nation states. For example, though the borders of Pakistan and Uzbekistan were drawn in much the same way as Afghanistan’s, they’d already established factories, railroads, roads, hospitals, and schools. Such tangible economic and political interests and infrastructure connected the people within those two countries, which has helped with the formation of their national identities.
In Afghanistan, the lack of a cohesive national infrastructure has been one of the primary causes of the repeated collapse of governments and the destructive conflicts over defining a national identity. In those conflicts, the role of the Taliban is fundamentally anti-national.
The Taliban movement is a continuation of movements that have been hostile toward modern state-building. They oppose the establishment of any system that would bring Afghanistan out of its traditional isolation and integrate it into the global community. They fear the formation of civil relations and non-rural mores. As a result, they oppose modern laws and favour traditions and sharia. They oppose modern education and the social participation of women, and replace national symbols and flags with religious and ethnic codes. They loathe figures whose names are tied to Afghanistan’s national identity, erasing their images and names from offices and educational curricula.
If we strip a nation of its flag, constitution, education, civil liberties, art, music, a government that meets minimal international standards of legitimacy, elections, parliament, political activity, and the formation of organizations and parties, what remains is merely land, governance, population, and a financial system.
In short, the Taliban regime can be described as follows: an armed group that compels Afghanistan’s inhabitants to obey, to pay taxes and tithes, and to provide fighters for their forces. Like feudal rulers, they demand fighters and money in exchange for security.
Nevertheless, over the past three decades, we have heard songs, slogans, and speeches with nationalist undertones also from within the Taliban. This raises a critical question: Do the Taliban believe in the concept of a nation? If so, what does the nation mean to them?
Nationalistic bragging
On December 24, 2024, Pakistan bombed areas in Barmal District of Paktika province, resulting in dozens of casualties. Pakistan claimed that the dead were Pakistani Taliban, while the Taliban regime stated that the victims were unarmed civilians. The Taliban leadership’s reaction to the attack was cautious, with no protests heard from Mullah Hibatullah, Mullah Hassan Akhund, or his deputies.
A day after the attack, Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid retweeted a statement from the Taliban’s Ministry of Defence, which described the Pakistani attack as a “brutal act, contrary to international principles, and an aggression.” The statement also mentioned the Taliban’s right to respond and defend themselves.
In the following days, reports emerged that the Taliban had attacked several Pakistani border posts. A few days later, Zabihullah Mujahid spoke of the Taliban’s good relations with Pakistan’s government and people in an interview with Shamshad TV and attributed the tensions to a specific faction within the Pakistani military. He claimed that the Taliban maintained friendly relations with the Pakistani army as a whole and blamed only a particular group causing tensions.
Since the Taliban’s rise to power, Pakistan’s military and intelligence leadership have changed. The government of Imran Khan was overthrown, and some of his military and intelligence allies were dismissed or imprisoned. Among them is former ISI chief Faiz Hamid who gained fame for his brief appearance in Kabul appearing to celebrate the Taliban takeover in August 2021. He is now in detention, and reports suggest that his rivals are pushing for severe punishment. Faiz Hamid’s fate highlights divisions within Pakistan’s intelligence and military apparatus, while Zabihullah Mujahid claims that a specific faction among these generals is behind the creation of recent tensions.
Even Taliban officials, such as Abbas Stanikzai, who sometimes ride the wave of nationalist sentiments, avoided discussing border disputes or territorial claims. In a fiery speech on December 4 at a graduation ceremony, Stanikzai asserted that the Taliban do not interfere in Pakistan’s internal affairs. He stated that those fighting against Pakistan today “are not our people; they are your own people. Sit with your people and solve your problems.”
Stanikzai also declared that Afghanistan is full of Mahmuds, Abdalis, and Baburs, each of whom is “an atomic bomb.” He added, “If we send five sons of Mahmuds, Abdalis, and Baburs after you, you won’t even withstand it in the Indian Ocean.” As he warned Pakistan about sending the “sons of Abdali, Mahmoud, and Babur,” the camera panned to Shahabuddin Delawar, a high-ranking Taliban official, who appeared to be dozing off while reclining on a couch. Next to him, another official glances around indifferently, while chewing naswar. The message is clear: Stanikzai’s boasts are so hollow that even his colleagues within the Taliban emirate do not take them seriously.
It is unfortunate that we have to write essays proving that the Taliban is not a national force with no connection to the legitimate aspirations of our people. It is equally regrettable that we must remind some of our compatriots not to fall into the trap of praising the Taliban.
A group that has stripped our people of their flag, national anthem, constitution, civil liberties, and the right to education, and openly regards democracy as corrupt, nationalism as un-Islamic, and women’s education as a crime, bears no connection to our nation or its values.
The core leadership of the Taliban emirate are composed of mullahs and madrasa students who view the world of politics through the lenses of conquest, jihad, emirate, caliphate, the ummah, the emir, and obedience. Concepts such as nation, freedom, independence, democracy, progress, development, education, research, and production, which preoccupy the minds of progressive nationalists are considered by the Taliban to be sources of corruption. This is why Mullah Hibatullah does not concern himself with building hospitals, schools, libraries, laboratories, or research centers. Instead, he constructs thousands of madrasas and orphanages each year to train jihadists, suicide bombers, and preachers.
Younus Negah is a researcher and writer from Afghanistan who is currently in exile in Turkey.