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The Taliban’s draconian policies are for social engineering, not bargaining

It has been three decades since the Taliban first made headlines when they emerged on the political stage in October 1994. That is when the group, largely unknown to most Afghans, seized the border district of Spin Boldak in Kandahar province and announced that their mission was to combat corruption and anarchy. They used the relatively modest name Islamic Movement of the Taliban [students] and professed no apparent ambition to form a government. Instead, they seemed posed to establish order and security and pave the way for formation of a new national government.

At the time, some analysts speculated that the Taliban were in contact with former King Zahir Shah and were facilitating his return. Others argued that the Taliban were merely proxies of Pakistan’s intelligence services, with no independent political agenda.

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Less than two years later, the Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996, yet remained an enigma. When they arrived in the capital, the war-weary masses, exhausted by years of internal conflict, welcomed them. Political forces, both inside and outside the country, scrambled to establish ties with the Taliban, hoping to secure roles in a new government to advance their own political objectives. Many in the political elite viewed the Taliban as a force both lacking a political program and incapable of governing.  

If the Taliban had no political agenda when they took Spin Boldak, they had certainly developed one by the time they reached Kabul. The group’s declaration of the Islamic Emirate, accompanied by policies that had no parallel in the region, delivered a second political shock to Afghanistan’s political elites.

During the five years of the Taliban’s Emirate, their stance on education, freedom, media, governance, and their overall approach to society and politics was so abnormal and contrary to the expectations of urban and educated populations that, when the U.S. and its allies invaded in 2001, no one sided with with the Taliban.  Most political forces welcomed their emirate’s collapse.

It was assumed that the Taliban’s Emirate was a temporary deviation from the modern course of politics in Afghanistan. As such, there was little serious examination of the political environment and historical and social origins of the group. Within a few years, the Taliban reemerged on the scene. By 2006, they had established themselves as a formidable challenge to those in power. By 2007, the Americans themselves recognized the Taliban as a decisive political force in Afghanistan’s future and entered into negotiations with them.

However, the Taliban’s political opponents within Afghanistan continued to deny their threat. Unfortunately, Afghanistan’s political factions, shaped and enriched by wartime projects, failed to maintain an organic and reciprocal connection with society. Their denial of the Taliban’s growing power was not based on facts or research. 

During the 20 years of the Islamic Republic, the elite made no serious attempt to understand the risks of extremism and Talibanization. The Taliban’s ties to tens of thousands of madrasas that spread like a spider’s web across the region were not taken seriously. Few issued serious warnings about the dangers posed by increasing poverty and instability, and that those social conditions were bolstering extremist groups like the Taliban. Meanwhile, the Taliban continued to catch their opponents off guard, gradually transforming from a fugitive insurgent group known for planting bombs into a claimant for governance.

Instead of acknowledging the existence of the Taliban and addressing the political and social factors that fostered their rise, the Islamic Republic’s government and political groups who opposed the Taliban resorted to superficial and propagandistic reactions. For instance, in response to American and allied efforts to contact and negotiate with the Taliban, Afghanistan’s government expelled Michael Semple, the deputy special representative of the European Union, and Mervyn Patterson, a senior United Nations staff member, on December 27, 2007. However, such actions did not sever the Taliban’s foreign contacts. Within a few years, they established an official office in Qatar.

The opening of that office was yet another shock to their opponents. In June 2013, Afghanistan’s political circles were embroiled in a debate over the Taliban flag being raised in Qatar. Then-president Hamid Karzai felt victorious after compelling the Obama administration to have the Taliban flag removed from the office wall. 

In February 2010, foreign and Afghan forces launched a “joint operation” against the Taliban in the districts of Nad Ali and Marjah. It marked the first time the Taliban faced thousands of foreign and domestic forces head-on in a big battlefield. While the Battle of Marjah was presented in the media as a campaign to suppress the Taliban, it left a new impression of the group in the public mind and surprised many observers.

After that, the Taliban’s control over parts of the country became normalized. By the eve of the Republic’s collapse, debate revolved around which side controlled most of the country’s territory. The Taliban claimed that most of the country was either under their control or within their reach, apart from Kabul, a few major cities, and some provincial and district centres. The government denied these claims though we all knew that the Taliban had established a parallel authority over vast areas of the country. They controlled or threatened trade and transit routes, operated their own shadow courts, and collected taxes and levies from various parts of Afghanistan.

The Taliban’s political and ideological agenda has not changed

With a campaign of terror and a focus on policies of exclusion, discrimination, and violence, the Taliban systematically tightened the noose around their political opponents and the people of Afghanistan. In the months leading up to the fall of the Republic, the Taliban ruthlessly targeted segments of society they considered ideologically opposed to their rule — journalists, civil society activists, and others striving for a non-Taliban way of life – while engaging in outreach to influential figures and politicians.

Educated women, girls, and institutions focused on women’s education and employment were systematically targeted. Despite this, certain political figures promoted the narrative of a “changed Taliban,” a claim that unfortunately garnered support from international actors as well.

Though some members of the Taliban negotiating team ambiguously hinted at possible policy changes—such as in the areas of women’s education and employment, the Taliban never declared that they would abandon the policies of their previous Emirate. The Taliban consistently emphasized their intent to reestablish the “Islamic Emirate” that had been forcibly removed from power. Even during the Doha negotiations, they refused to identify themselves as a group or a party, signing the agreement under the title of the “Islamic Emirate.”  

When the Taliban ultimately seized control of the entire country, people, caught between despair and hope, expected that at least some of their fundamental rights, including access to education and work, would be preserved. This hope was built on two unfounded assumptions:

  • Some believed that the Taliban had gained power through an understanding with foreign powers, and perhaps the hidden annexes of the Doha Agreement or agreements of Western support for the Taliban’s Emirate included conditions to avoid excluding women from education and work. This belief led people and even politicians to hope that the Taliban would approach women with more leniency. 
  • Some assumed that the Taliban had realized that they needed to be flexible and acknowledge basic rights and freedoms  — particularly for women, minorities, and political dissenters — or they would face serious resistance and challenges. This belief suggested that the Taliban had been forced to retreat from their reactionary policies by both circumstances and time.

Taliban leaders never spoke of change or flexibility. Their sole gesture was a general amnesty, which was conditional on obedience. The core of this amnesty required acceptance of the Emirate and adherence to Taliban decrees, which they branded as sharia. This deception was used by politically naive actors to create false hopes for a “changed Taliban.” At the beginning of the Taliban’s rule, a long line of intellectuals and politicians — many of whom had lived non-Taliban lifestyles themselves — joined the ranks of Taliban supporters and justified the decrees of Mullah Hibatullah.

Through decrees, speeches, gatherings, military displays, and, most importantly, their policies, Mullah Hibatullah and Taliban leaders made it clear that their goal was to build an authentic Taliban Emirate. They sought to train suicide battalions, construct madrasas, cultivate a new generation of jihadists, and emphasized that providing for the people was not their responsibility but rather should be left to God. They claimed that worldly freedom held no value. Instead, true freedom lay in obedience to the “Amir-al-Mu’minin” (Leader of the Faithful). The Taliban stated that no internal or external pressure could change their minds about creating an Islamic Emirate.

Some opponents and segments of the public refused to believe the Taliban’s proclamations. A portion of the Taliban’s opponents continued to delude themselves, insisting that the Taliban’s policies were the work of external forces. Some still claim that the decrees are not truly from the Taliban but the result of ISI generals working under the guise of Mullah Hibatullah to destabilize Afghanistan. Today, it is not uncommon to hear well-educated individuals assert that “Mullah Hibatullah is suspicious! Perhaps such a person doesn’t even exist.” They are unwilling to acknowledge the political and ideological existence of the Taliban or the calamity bred over decades in religious madrasas.

Some believe that the Taliban have taken women’s rights and freedoms hostage to leverage them for political gains and recognition on the international stage. They fail to accept that the Taliban are actively working to engineer society to align with their ideological and political ideals. So when girls were banned from attending university during the first year of the Taliban’s rule, many believed the restriction was temporary. Later, when secondary and high schools were closed to girls, a large segment of the population clung to the promise hoping that schools would reopen soon.

Until recently, those who harbored hope for a “changed Taliban” urged opponents to exercise patience, arguing that their policies were temporary. They pointed to the continued operation of health education and training institutes and the presence of women in some Taliban-run offices as evidence that the Taliban were not ideologically opposed to women’s education and employment but were instead using these restrictions for political bargaining. They argued that if the Taliban were assured of the legitimacy of their Emirate and felt confident their government would not be challenged, they would gradually reopen the doors to education, employment, and even broader freedoms.

However, three decades of the Taliban’s presence in Afghan politics, coupled with the three years of their new Emirate, provide ample evidence to dispel such illusions. These records compel us to acknowledge that the Taliban are an ideological force with a clear agenda, striving to create what they perceive as an “ideal” society. The roots of their decrees extend beyond intelligence agencies, political deals, or Afghanistan’s societal backwardness and lie deeply embedded in the group’s ideological framework and foundational thinking.

We must accept that the Taliban’s political agenda has not changed and that they possess a coherent framework for the Emirate they aspire to establish. Denying the Taliban’s existence as an ideological and fundamentalist movement with a clear agenda, while overemphasizing hidden factors or foreign support or reducing them to a mere tool of foreign intelligence services is neither effective nor realistic.

Overemphasizing external factors Is misleading

To understand any phenomenon, it must be studied from three perspectives: first, the environment in which it emerged; second, the factors that contribute to its growth and persistence; and third, and most importantly, the nature of the phenomenon itself. 

It is important to understand how Pakistan’s intelligence agencies and other nations contributed to the Taliban’s initial formation, and how Afghanistan’s chaotic and underdeveloped environment enabled their rise. It is also essential to recognize that the U.S. and its allies are now effectively funding and granting concessions to the Taliban, and that countries like Russia, China, Iran, Qatar, and Pakistan each seek to use the Taliban as a tool for their own political and economic goals. Afghanistan’s political and cultural fractures have also aided the Taliban’s growth, with thousands of non-Taliban individuals cooperating with them for short-term benefits and personal gain.

However, the existence of the Taliban themselves must not be overlooked, nor should we forget to study their “physiology.” The mission of Afghan media, politicians, and researchers opposed to the Taliban does not end with expressions of shock or reports on their catastrophic policies. 

Voicing disdain or declaring resistance against the Taliban is not enough. We must acknowledge the Taliban’s existence as a deeply rooted political and ideological entity with independent interests and ideals. It is crucial to recognize that the Taliban’s actions and policies are not merely tactics, nor are they born purely of ignorance or dependence. Behind these policies is a movement with a plan — a vision of social engineering in Afghanistan and beyond.

If we fail to do this, the Taliban will continue to repeatedly shock us with the stark difference between the imagined Taliban in our minds and the real one, which is actively dismantling and devastating a society. 

Younus Negah is a researcher and writer from Afghanistan who is currently in exile in Turkey.


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