What Trump’s return means to ‘Abdul’ and the Doha Agreement?
The victory of Donald Trump in the U.S. presidential election is a significant event that will have a lasting impact on U.S. domestic politics and on the country’s international role. For this reason, many around the world wonder how a new Trump administration will also affect their lives.
Afghan politicians, including the Taliban, are eager to understand what Trump’s victory might mean for them. Taliban factions involved in the Doha negotiations with the first Trump administration are likely pleased with his imminent return to the White House, believing their past contacts with Trump’s team could help them secure a prominent seat at the table if the US again changes things. Meanwhile, the opposition hope that Trump and his officials may decide that the implementation of the Doha Agreement is incomplete and pressure the Taliban to fulfill its fourth clause.
The four main points of the Doha Agreement signed in 2020, in brief, are:
- Afghanistan will not be used to attack the U.S. and its allies
- American-led forces would withdraw from Afghanistan
- Intra-Afghan negotiations would take place
- A permanent ceasefire will be established in Afghanistan, with the participants in the intra-Afghan talks agreeing on a political roadmap for the country’s future.
It was always emphasized that those four issues were re interlinked and dependent on one another. The term “intra-Afghan negotiations” was one of the most frequently used phrases in the agreement. Since announcing he would again run for office, Trump criticized his rivals for the implementation of the Doha Agreement. He accused the Democrats of “handing Afghanistan over to China” and claimed that if he were in power, he would not have surrendered Bagram Air Base to forces he called America’s enemies.
Trump has also claimed that Taliban leaders were obedient to him, stating that a leader he called “Abdul” addressed him as “Your Excellency.” Still, much is unclear, including whether Trump would continue the current relationship between the Taliban and the U.S., such as ongoing dollar payments, or if he would pressure the Taliban to resume intra-Afghan talks and form a “new post-agreement Islamic government.”
If we consider the policies of Trump’s first term, there is little expectation that he would pressure the Taliban into forming an inclusive government. The crux of his foreign policy position was that it is not the U.S. mission to bring democracy to Afghanistan or to engage in “nation-building.” Trump insisted on bringing American troops home, and the Doha Agreement was signed to that end.
However, there are aspects of Trump’s working style and personal characteristics that raise hopes that developments may be possible.
Opportunities for lobbying Trump’s administration
As a presidential candidate, Donald Trump ran opposing the bureaucracy in Washington. Using public dissatisfaction with bureaucracy and red tape, he presented himself as the architect of a governing style where decisions, like in the business world, are made swiftly with minimal bureaucracy. This approach increases the potential influence of lobbyists and interest groups on his decisions. In the Doha Agreement, for example, he paid little heed to the voices of the U.S. diplomatic and military apparatus, dismissing the views of generals and politicians. Instead, he granted significant authority to his secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, and, in particular, special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, who played a prominent role in shaping the agreement.
Much is still unknown, but Trump’s future policies are likely to follow the same patterns as in his first term. The direct deployment of military forces and direct intervention inside Afghanistan seems unlikely. However, Trump might revisit the Doha Agreement to demonstrate to a domestic American audience that he is more successful than his rivals in fulfilling international missions. If the deal is back on the table, its fourth clause (intra-Afghan talks and agreement on a political roadmap) will likely come to the forefront, especially if the anti-Taliban factions have the capacity to lobby and connect with the White House and trusted aides. However, if Pakistan and the Taliban lobbies gain the upper hand, then negotiations on the agreement could shift to debating whether the Taliban has succeeded in fulfilling its primary commitment — preventing Afghanistan from being used against U.S. interests — and thus is entitled to formal recognition.
If Trump wants to deal with Afghanistan issues, then there’s a likelihood of Zalmay Khalilzad once again playing a crucial role. His return would shorten the line of communication between Afghan leaders and the U.S. president, allowing politicians and groups to directly influence U.S. policy on Afghanistan through him.
As before, a central question remains: Which side will act more effectively and cohesively – the Taliban and its allies or anti-Taliban factions?
China’s role
Trump opposes giving military and financial aid to Ukraine. He also insists that the U.S. should focus its resources on containing China. The main area of conflict between the U.S. and China will be Southeast Asia, though China’s trade and transit routes in Central Asia and South Asia will also become an arena of confrontation.
Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, China has a stronger presence in Afghanistan. Chinese investments have resumed, and political and diplomatic contacts between the Taliban and China have advanced to the point of officially appointing ambassadors. Trump repeatedly claimed in his campaign speeches that the Biden administration handed Afghanistan over to China. The question now is whether to counter China, will Trump support the Taliban’s opponents.
If the opposition can present a viable alternative, capable of challenging the Taliban, then the Doha Agreement might become an important tool of pressure against the Taliban and a way to finally hold intra-Afghan talks.
Younus Negah is a researcher and writer from Afghanistan who is currently in exile in Turkey.
